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THE COMIBINATION OF FUNCTIONS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS: AN
EXAMINATION OF EUROPEAN
ALTERNATIVES
RONALD D. ROTUNDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMMENTATORS have often discussed, and sometimes lamented,
the problem of the bias of public administrators' who rule what has
rightly been called the Fourth Branch of Government. This bias can
manifest itself in more than one form. For instance, some public bureau-
crats become biased because they do not-and cannot-keep a judicial
aloofness from the industries they regulate. An important natural (but
not necessary) consequence of this organizational arrangement is that the
regulators-wined, dined, and perhaps promised future employment by
the regulated-yield to temptation and become captured by the people
they are supposed to control.2 Economic or personal interest in the out-
come of the dispute causes the regulators to become hopelessly biased and,
consequently, they can no longer objectively regulate
An administrator may also be biased in the sense that he has pre-
judged the law, perhaps by deciding a similar case. To have thought
out a problem, to be well-informed, to understand and favor the enforce-
ment of the policy underlying a given law is admittedly a certain kind of
bias, but it is not unwelcome.4 The executive should desire an adminis-
* Member of the New York and Washington, D.C. bars; A.B., Harvard College, 1967;
J3D., Harvard Law School, 1970; Associated with the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
Washington, D.C.
The author acknowledges the assistance of Professor M. Cappelletti of the University of
Florence, Italy, in providing translations of many of the foreign sources.
1. See, e.g., L. Koblmeier, Jr., The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies and the Public Inter-
est 69-82 (1969); S. Rosenblum, How to Get into TV: The Federal Communications Com-
mission and Miami's Channel 10, in The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in American Politics 173
(A. Westin ed. 1962).
2. See Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 173, 196, 219-21.
3. But see DePauw Univ. v. Brunk, 53 F.2d 647 (WD. Mo. 1931), aff'd on other grounds,
28S U.S. 527 (1932) (probate judge may decide whether estate is taxable, determine the
amount of the tax, and receive 234% of the tax as compensation for his services). See also
Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. McFall, 128 Tenn. 645, 163 S.W. 806 (1913).
4. See Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 18 (10th Cir. 1967), afPd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, sub nom. Peruvian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 US. 747 (1968); cf. Safe-
way Stores v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1966); Elman, A Note on Administrative
Adjudication, 74 Yale L.J. 652, 653 (1965) ("agency members have a more active and affirm-
ative commitment to achieving the goals and effectuating the policies declared by Congress
."). But cf. Air Transport Ass'n v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
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trator who is biased in favor of effective enforcement since "[i]t is a
sine qua non of a good administration that it believe in the rightness and
worth of the laws which it is enforcing and that it be prepared to bring
to the task zeal and astuteness in finding out and making effective those
purposes."'
There is, however, a third type of bias which is equally important.
Regulators may become dangerously biased as a function of the insti-
tutional arrangement of the agency in which they work. When the public
bureaucrat combines within himself the role of both prosecutor and judge,
he runs the risk that, if he is not captured by the people he is supposed
to control, he may well be captured by his own thinking. Unlike the
bias of prejudgment of the law which promotes effective administrative
enforcement, this third type of bias has little to do with effectiveness.
And, unlike the bias caused by an economic or personal interest on the
part of the administrator, this third type of bias is more difficult to con-
trol and hence more dangerous because it produces a conflict of intellec-
tual interests which flow from a biased mind. It is this type of bias-
the bias caused by the basic institutional arrangement of an agency
which allows a combination of functions-that is the focus of this article.
II. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL
BIAS CAUSED BY A COMBINATION OF FUNCTIONS
The extent to which an administrator can combine in himself the
functions of prosecutor and judge, like most interesting constitutional
questions, is not clearly answerable. In deportation cases, for example,
the Supreme Court has been very generous in allowing the combination
of functions. At first the Court was more reluctant and required that ad-
judication and prosecution be separated, on the ground that section 5
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) forbade a combination of
such functions.' In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,7 a deportation hearing
was held before an immigration inspector. Under regulations in force at
5. Jaffe, The Reform of Administrative Procedure, 2 Pub. Ad. Rev. 141, 149 (1942) ; ac-
cord, 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 12.01, at 130-33 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Davis]. Unfortunately, administrators often develop biases in favor of more and more regula-
tion, whether or not increased regulation would effectuate the purposes of the law. See gen-
erally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 14-16 (1965) (case study of the
ICC).
6. E.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); see Administrative Procedure
Act, ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. 237, 240 (1946). That part of section 5 forbidding combination of
functions is now APA § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970). Section 5(d) reads in part: "An
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the de-
cision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to Section 557 of this title, except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings." Id.
7. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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that time, the presiding inspector could not be the one who had investi-
gated the case before him. However, the presiding inspector could and
did investigate similar cases. During one day an inspector might be hear-
ing cases investigated by a colleague and on the following day bring his
own investigation of a case before the same colleague whose case he had
passed on the day before Moreover, it could even become the duty of
the examining inspector to lodge an additional charge against the alien
and proceed to hear his own accusation in like manner. The Court held
that section 5 of the APA, which prohibited such practices, applied.
Although this decision was grounded in a technical interpretation of the
APA-whether the APA exempted deportation hearings held before im-
migration inspectors-the Court seemed to speak in constitutional terms:
It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of impar-
tiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has been con-
demned by Congress as unfair even where less vital matters of property rights are
at stake.'0
Only five years later, in Marcello v. Bonds," the same Supreme Court
substantially reversed itself. Congress had reestablished the procedures
condemned in Wong Yang Sung but now explicitly removed these pro-
cedures from the requirements of section 5 of the APA,1' thus opening
the door to possible bias. Furthermore, the hearing officers were now
supervised by the district directors who were also responsible for all
investigatory activities within their districts. The petitioner objected that
statutorily such supervision should be subject to section 5, and that
constitutionally the supervision and other procedures were a violation of
due process. The Supreme Court, however, held that there was no viola-
tion of the APA or of due process.' This holding has since been ex-
tended so that it is now also proper for the hearing officer to examine
witnesses and present evidence in support of the charge against the
defendant. 4
In addition to the law allowing the combination of functions in depor-
8. This practice in state proceedings was upheld in, e.g., Marrano Constr. Co. v. New York
Comm'n for Human Rights, 45 Misc. 2d 1081, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
9. 339 U.S. at 46, citing federal regulations in effect at that time.
10. Id. at 50-51.
11. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970) states: "[The procedure of this act] shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section."
13. 349 U.S. at 311. The dissent objected on statutory grounds. Id. at 315-19 (dissenting
opinion). Justice Black, in his dissent, also strongly suggested that such a procedure was a
violation of due process: "The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes
or supervise and control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly
inconsistent with our concepts of justice." Id. at 318.
14. Roccaforte v. Mulcahey, 169 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Aass.), affd per curiam, 262 F.2d
957 (1st Cir. 1958).
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tation cases, there is also a body of case law permitting a similar com-
bination in the operations of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)."
Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act also imposes on the FTC
the duty to make special reports to Congress." In FTC v. Cement In-
stitute 7 a series of reports claiming that the basing point system of
pricing and its variations produced certain results in the economy which
amounted to unfair competition had been issued by the FTC pursuant to
section 6. Although the FTC had concentrated its report on the steel in-
dustry's use of the basing point system, it stated that it regarded the
cement industry as similar to steel. Subsequently, the FTC charged the
Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company with engaging in unfair
methods of competition through use of the basing point system. Marquette
claimed bias on the part of the FTC Commissioners because, it alleged,
they had prejudged the facts. The FTC denied bias and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' 8 largely because of what is known as
the Rule of Necessity. Thus, where the only agency authorized to act in
a controversy is allegedly biased, the agency nonetheless has jurisdiction
to act since the alternative is nonenforcement of the law, and the FTC is
"the only tribunal clothed with the power and charged with the respon-
sibility of protecting the public against unfair methods of competition
and price discrimination."'
The Supreme Court affirmed,20 partly because of the Rule of Necessity
but also because the FTC's publication of its conclusions regarding the
basing point system was not a sufficient showing of bias, even though its
conclusions were published before the litigation began:
In the first place, the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the
result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of
its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point
practice ...
Moreover, Marquette's position, if sustained, would to a large extent defeat the
congressional purposes which prompted passage of the Trade Commission Act.21
Professor Davis admits that the preconceived views of the FTC were
not only ideas about law and policy, but also about facts. Yet he agrees
15. The FTC is generally responsible for regulating business in interstate commerce in order
to prevent unfair methods of competition. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970).
16. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970).
17. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
18. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd sub nom.
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
19. 147 F.2d at 594.
20. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
21. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
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with the decision of the Supreme Court, not for the reasons that it gives
but because the facts that were prejudged were legislative facts, not ad-
judicative facts?2 Professor Davis defines "legislative facts" as facts
which do not usually concern the immediate parties but which are general
facts. On the other hand "adjudicative facts" are the kind which go to
a jury-they "usually answer the questions of who did what, where,
when, how, why, with what motive or intent .. .,-"3 Professor Davis
argues that the agency should be required to hold a hearing for the deter-
uination of adjudicative facts but not for legislative facts. Even accept-
ing this last proposition as correct,24 one must still be willing to accept his
argument that the facts in Cement Institute were legislative, a proposition
which is not without doubt.2 Even then, while the difference between
legislative and adjudicative facts forms a satisfactory test to determine
when due process requires a hearing, it makes little sense to carry this
proposition to different areas of administrative law without qualification.
Surely if all the circumstances of a case indicate that an administrator,
in his role as a prosecutor or advocate, had been deeply involved in the
investigation of the facts of a particular problem, it would not be desir-
able for him to sit in judgment on that case even though the facts were
labeled as "legislative" ones.26 One is still left with the possibility that
the prior ex parte investigation might have intellectually biased the ad-
ministrator. Such intellectual bias could very well have been present in
the Cement Institute case where it would have at the very least been
embarrassing for the Federal Trade Commissioners to have publicly
repudiated their prior report. Despite these words of caution it may still,
for other reasons, be sound policy to allow the agency to adjudicate in
such circumstances (assuming that the facts were legislative ones). It
would likewise be sound policy for the court to exercise an especially
close review of the agency's findings. Yet such a close review is presently
not the practice in the federal courts.'
The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts cannot ex-
plain the holding in Pangburn v. CAB." After an airline crash the Civil
22. 2 Davis § 12.01, at 145 n.53.
23. 1 Davis § 7.02, at 413.
24. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 US. 441 (1915) with
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
25. Professor Davis admits as much. See Davis § 12.01, at 434 (Supp. 1970).
26. See American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 1966), which does not
base its decision disqualifying the FTC Chairman on the difference between legislative and
adjucative facts.
27. European courts do give this close review. See notes 88-107 infra and accompanying
text.
28. 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
1971]
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Aeronautics Board (CAB) investigated the accident and determined that
its cause was misjudgment on the part of the pilot. The CAB also issued
public reports to this effect. At the same time the administrator of the
CAB initiated proceedings against the pilot in order to determine if his
license should be suspended. The trial examiner's hearing came to the
conclusion that the accident was the pilot's fault. The public report of the
CAB's investigation preceded the decision of the trial examiner by two
days. The pilot then appealed the finding of the trial examiner to the
full board of the CAB, which duly affirmed the suspension order and
rejected the pilot's argument that it had prejudged the case.30 On appeal,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, citing FTC v. Cement Institute,31
stated that the combination of investigative and judicial functions of the
full board of the CAB did not violate due process."2 It was apparently
irrelevant to the First Circuit that the members of the CAB who had
publicly committed themselves through the published report to the con-
clusion that the pilot was guilty even before the hearing on his suspen-
sion was completed were the same men who reviewed the suspension order.
Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC' illustrates a tendency different from Pang-
burn. When Manuel F. Cohen was Director of the Division of Cor-
poration Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission, his
department filed charges against Amos Treat for wilful violations of the
Securities Exchange Act. Mr. Cohen was later promoted to be an SEC
Commissioner and participated in an SEC ruling deemed critical by Amos
Treat. 4 When Amos Treat moved that the SEC discontinue the revo-
cation proceeding on the grounds that Mr. Cohen's participation violated
section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,"5 the SEC held that
29. Id. at 351.
30. Id.
31. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
32. 311 F.2d at 356. See also Dean Foods Co., 20 Ad. L.2d 403 (FTC 1966). The Com-
mission denied a motion that the FTC dismiss the complaint because FTC counsel, when
applying to the court of appeals for a preliminary injunction, made statements inconsistent
with an impartial judicial attitude on the part of the FTC. Commissioner Elman, dissenting,
argued that the FTC had not met Dean Foods' argument that the FTC had prejudged the
factual issues of the case: "[C]ounsel for the Commission . . . were insensitive or indifferent
to these considerations [demanding impartiality] in presenting the Commission's position be-
fore the Court of Appeals." Id. at 427 (dissenting opinion).
33. 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
34. Id. at 262.
35. Section 5(c) has since been renumbered 5(d). It now reads:
"(d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of
this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557
of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the
disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not-
[Vol. 40
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section 5 (c) did not apply because it explicitly excepted the agency or a
member or members of the body comprising the agency." Mr. Cohen,
as an SEC Commissioner, was a member of the body comprising the
agency.
On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals not only
held that section 5(c) did apply to prevent Mr. Cohen's participation
but also held that it was unable to accept the view that a member of
an investigative or prosecutorial staff may initiate an investigation,
weigh its results, and perhaps then recommend the filing of charges, and
then subsequently become a member of the commission or agency, parti-
cipate in adjudicatory proceedings, join in commission or agency rulings,
and ultimately pass upon the possible liability of the respondents.3" Sig-
nificantly, the court added that "[o] nly thus can the tribunal conducting
a quasi-adjudicatory proceeding meet the basic requirements of due
process." '3 Subsequent cases have, however, narrowed the effectiveness
of Amos Treat.3 9
(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency. An em-
ployee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the de-
cision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except
as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply-
(A) in determining applications for initial licenses;
(B) to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of
public utilities or carriers; or
(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
36. 306 F.2d at 263.
37. Id. at 266.
38. Id. at 267.
39. The same circuit a year later partially retreated from this ruling when it refused to
enjoin administrative proceedings on the ground that two commissioners should be disqual-
ified because of their prior SEC staff service related to the issues in the proceedings. The court
distinguished Amos Treat because, unlike that case, the SEC now denied the previous partid-
pation of the commissioners. The denial was considered crucial:
"[A]dministrative proceedings cannot be stopped to allow for excursions in the courts with
prolonged evidentiary hearings; the time for that in a proper case is when an aggrieved
litigant seeks judicial review of agency action having preserved the point of claimed disqual-
ification in the administrative hearing." SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284, 287 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963). While this ruling is understandable, a subsequent
holding of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which involved the same parties has perhaps
narrowed the effect of Amos Treat too much. There the court held that when the challenged
commissioner denies by formal sworn statement his participation as a prosecutor in the case
before him, there is no ground for complaint if the administrative trial examiner refuses to
issue subpoenas to the challenged commissioner, several SEC staff members, and a former
1971]
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State courts are more likely to echo the theme of the federal courts
found in Pangburn and its progeny. For example, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has held that when a member of the Board of Regents of State
Colleges, acting as counsel for the prosecution (who brought charges to
remove a tenured teacher) is presenting evidence and entering objections
to evidence offered in behalf of the defendant-teacher, and when the same
person also presides as judge at the same hearing, there is no per se
violation of due process. It is only when the above combination of func-
tions is added to additional serious objections that there are enough de-
fects to constitute a denial of a fair hearing.40
Though the Wisconsin court did not discuss the Rule of Necessity,
state courts usually invoke that doctrine to justify a combination of
functions that encourages bias.4 ' Thus in Sharkey v. Thurston,42 the New
York Court of Appeals unanimously upheld an administrative procedure
under which the mayor filed charges, conducted the hearing, and then
removed some city functionaries. The Rule of Necessity, which alone
justified the result in Sharkey, was discussed at length in Brinkley v.
Hassig:4
3
If an administrative tribunal may on its own initiative investigate, file a complaint,
and then try the charge so preferred, due process is not denied here because one or
more members of the board aided in the investigation.
Assuming such preconceived prejudice, what is the answer? The statute provides
but one tribunal with power to revoke a doctor's license, just as the Supreme Court
of Kansas is the only body with power to disbar a lawyer ...
From the very necessity of the case has grown the rule that disqualification will not
be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. If the law pro-
vides for a substitution of personnel on a board or court, or if another tribunal exists
commissioner in order to gather testimony about the alleged participation of the challenged
commissioner in the investigation. R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446, 452-54 (2d
Cir. 1966). While courts are properly reluctant to allow fishing expeditions by counsel
merely upon allegation of impropriety, the court should allow them when counsel has good
reason to believe that something is indeed amiss.
40. State v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 211, 94 N.W.2d 711, 722 (1959).
41. E.g., Rose v. State Bd. of Registration, 397 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1965) ; State v. City of
Livingston, 144 Mont. 248, 395 P.2d 971 (1964) (semble) ; Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123,
196 N.E. 766 (1935) ; Emerson v. Hughes, 117 Vt. 270, 90 A.2d 910 (1952).
42. 268 N.Y. 123, 196 N.E. 766 (1935).
43. 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936). In Brinkley, the president of the board revoking a
doctor's license was also secretary of the medical society in which capacity he was the Inter-
mediary through whom all complaints were cleared. Another member of the board, after
listening to testimony for three days said he was ready to vote. "The president told him that
no vote could be cast until all the testimony was in. The impatient member assented, and
resumed his task." Id. at 356. The court said that "doubtless all [members of the board] were
in fact prejudiced." Id.
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to which resort may be had, a disqualified member may not act. But where no such
provision is made, the law cannot be nullified or the doors to justice barred because of
prejudice or disqualification of a member of a court or an administrative tribuna1 4
Although the combination of functions in administrative actions raises
a definite possibility of bias, it should not be concluded that all adminis-
trative hearings and proceedings are unfair. Often there are no procedural
irregularities in an administrative hearing, and regulations, if not the
Constitution, forbid certain procedural irregularities 5 Likewise, some
courts refuse to follow the Rule of Necessity.4" In practice American ad-
ministrative hearings are often unbiased in fact. However, it can generally
be said that there is no constitutional guarantee against the institutional
bias caused by combining prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicative
functions in the same body of men 4
III. TRIAL EXAmINERS AND THE ADMNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Because of the fear of possible bias there have often been outcries
against the combination of functions in American administrative actions.
As a response to these often justified criticisms, the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941 recommended certain
reforms in the administrative process. The Committee majority did not
propose complete separation of functions; rather it proposed internal
separation of some functions. Within the same agency, divisions sepa-
rate from each other were to handle prosecution and adjudication.O And,
perhaps most importantly, the Report proposed that the trial examiners
in each agency be independent.0 l1 The trial examiner "in the first flush of
the New Deal was apt to be very much a part of the agency organisation
and to share enthusiastically in its plans for the future. He acted on occa-
44. Id. at 357.
45. E.g., the provision that an SEC Commissioner "should disqualify himself in the event
he obtained knowledge prior to becoming a member [of the Commission] of the facts at issue
before him in a quasi-judicial proceeding .... ." 17 C.F.R. § 200.60 (1971).
46. "It would then be manifestly unfair to require respondent to submit himself to a
hearing before the committee, which had at least tentatively prejudged the matter as evidenced
by the charges which it had brought against respondent." Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 546,
207 P. 724, 727 (1922). See also Glass v. State Highway Comm'r, 370 MAich. 482, 122 N.W.2d
651 (1963).
47. 2 Davis § 1302, at 181.
48. Attorney Gen. Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Final Report (1941).
49. Id. at 208. The dissent to this report recommended complete external separation. "So
long as both investigators and prosecutors, on the one hand, and hearing and deciding officers,
on the other, are subject to the same superior authority, there is an inevitable commingling of
all these functions." Id. at 209.
5o. Id. at 55.
51. Id.
19711
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sion with the zeal of Dufarge and his Madame.11 2 The trial examiner,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, is qualified by the Civil Service
Commission, an agency independent of any of the operating agencies.
Moreover, the trial examiner is free from removal by the operating
agency; he conducts the initial hearing but engages in no other function.
Although section 8(a) of the APA states that the agency shall have
"all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision,"54 the
independence of the trial examiner is still relevant. The examiner's reports
must now be made and served in circumstances in which they were not
required before the enactment of the APA. His reports also become a
part of the record with the result that the agency is in some cases relieved
of responsibility for exercising its independent judgment on the evidence.,,
However, it is easy to exaggerate the new found independence and im-
portance of the trial examiner. First, practically all cases decided by the
trial examiner are reviewed by the administrative agency, either because
a party appeals or because the agency calls the case up for review. 0
Secondly, the power of the agency to review the trial examiner is broad.
Only in deciding questions of fact does the trial examiner demand any
respect, and even in such circumstances the agency need not give the
examiner as much respect as a judge must give to the jury on matters of
demeanor or credibility."
A third factor which limits the role of the trial examiner is the Civil
Service regulations. Ideally the examiner should be independent of all
unhealthy influences of the agency for which he works. However, the
Civil Service regulations governing the examiner's relation to the agency
undermine this goal. These regulations allow: (1) the classification of
the hearing examiners of any given agency into different grades;"" (2) the
promotion of the hearing examiners to higher grades upon recommenda-
tion of the agency;59 (3) agency choice as to how a vacancy may be
filled (by promotion from within the agency or otherwise);0o (4) the
52. Jaffe, The American Administrative Procedure Act, 1956 Pub. L. 218, 218-19.
53. Id. at 226-27.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1970).
55. 2 Davis § 10.03, at 15.
56. Id.
57. E.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955) (error for circuit
court to require that examiner's findings based on demeanor not be overruled by Board with-
out "a very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded" since the standard is not
that strict); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (examiner's findings may
be reversed by the NLRB even when not clearly erroneous). A similar rule applies In the
majority of state courts. 2 Davis § 10.03, at 17-18.
58. 5 C.F.R. § 34.10 (1961).
59. Id. § 34.4.
60. Id. § 34.3.
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assignment of examiners not in a mechanical rotation0 ' but with regard
to the so-called difficulty of the cases or competence of the particular
examiners;62 and (5) the reduction of the number of examiners under
circumstances similar to the reduction in work force of other federal em-
ployees, notwithstanding a statutory provision that examiners may only
be removed for good cause as established by the Civil Service Commis-
sion.' In Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference," a divided
Supreme Court upheld these challenged regulations, concluding that they
did not violate any provisions of the APA. Justice Black, joined by Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Douglas-an unusual trinity-issued a strong dis-
sent. 5 The legislative history of the act showed that the purpose of the
legislation was to elevate the trial examiners to "very nearly the equiva-
lent of judges even though operating within the Federal system of admin-
istrative justice,"66 but the regulations upheld by the Court, the dissent
noted, went a long way toward frustrating the examiners' independence.
Justice Black argued that the ruling with respect to the assignment of
cases by administrative heads was especially unfortunate:
A central objective [of the Administrative Procedure Act] was to prevent agency
heads from using powers over assignments to influence cases. Unlimited discretion in
assignment would lead to subservient examiners, it was thought. But the effect of the
Civil Service classifications is to restore the unlimited discretion existing before pas-
sage of the Administratve Procedure Act.67
The last factor restricting the trial examiner's importance is that sec-
tion 5 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act by its terms does not apply
to certain circumstances.6 These circumstances include proceedings to
procure initial licenses, any rule-making, and the setting of future rates
of a regulated industry. The purpose of these exceptions was to strike a
61. But cf. notes 92-97 infra and accompanying text (the Italian and German concepts of
the "lawful judge").
62. 5 C.F.R. § 34.12 (1961). Not only on the administrative level but also on the judicial
level there is no requirement of a strict rotation of judges between cases. See Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 563-64 (1969).
63. 5 C.F.R. § 34.15 (1961).
64. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
65. Id. at 143 (dissenting opinion).
66. S. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951).
67. 345 U.S. at 145. The constitutions and case law of several European countries explicitly
disallow the nonmechanical rotation of administrative judges. See text accompanying notes
79-107 infra.
68. The section does not apply "(A) in determining applications for initial licenses; (B) to
proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public
utilities or carriers; or (C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the
agency." 5 US.C. § 554(d) (1970).
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compromise between those forces which desired complete separation of
functions and those that did not by only requiring the hearing examiner
to be an independent observer when the proceedings are strongly accu-
satory. Unfortunately these exceptions to section 5(d) allow some un-
seemly activity to occur. For example, because proceedings involving the
setting of future rates are not included within the procedural guarantees
of section 5(d), the following activity described by an Interstate Com-
merce Commissioner has occurred:
A majority [of the ICC Commissioners] had decided the case in a certain way. Now,
counsel for the Commission who had tried the case spent 2 or 3 hours in two or three
different periods of time in the privacy of the Commission chambers, in executive
session, and argued that the majority's decision was wrong, that it could not be de-
fended on appeal, and even suggested that the decision could not be written logically
or intelligently. 69
Following the exceptions of section 5 (d), the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has held, in Wilson & Co. v. United States,7 ° that there is no
statutory provision barring lawyers of the Federal Communications Com-
mission who were advocates and counsel of record at the FCC hearing
from ex parte participation in the decisional process when the hearing
involves setting rates for the future. 71
Professor Davis apparently 2 disapproves of Wilson. Yet he does not
object to the combination of functions in administrative rule-making. He
seems to be arguing that deciding rates for an entire industry is more
adjudicative than legislative, while deciding future rules (other than
rates) is more legislative than adjudicative. He defends this distinction-
allowing the combination of functions for so-called "real" rule-making-
by pointing out that when an agency uses the adjudicative process to
make rules there is no need for the administrators to avoid a combination
of functions because they are fulfilling a legislative task, i.e., they are
not making decisions, they are making rules. Professor Davis then argues
69. Hearings on S. 658 Before the House Comm. on Interstate Commerce and Foreign
Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1951). See also id. at 164.
70. 335 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
71. Id. at 796-97. The Food and Drug Administration follows much the same procedure.
Cf. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 2 F.C.C.2d 142, 157 (1965) (Loevinger, Comm'r,
dissenting). What the Seventh Circuit allowed would be unconstitutional in many European
countries. See, e.g., Alessandro v. The Consiglio Di Prefettura of Sassari, 11 Giur. Cost. 879
(1966) (Corte Costituzionale). See generally Levine, Separation of Functions in FDA Admin-
istrative Proceedings, 23 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 132 (1968).
72. Professor Davis has said that the case was "ill-considered" and not in line with many
Supreme Court opinions. Davis § 13.00, at 454 (Supp. 1970). However, he has also said that
Wilson was "dearly sound as to the APA" and is in line with several Supreme Court decisions.
Id. § 13.02, at 458.
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that we should permit this combination of functions because, after all, we
permit legislators to advocate laws (rules), advise their fellow lawmakers
on the formulation and scope of these laws, and also vote on these same
laws.7
Though Professor Davis has correctly summarized the present state of
the law, he is wrong in his attempt to justify it. He has emphasized the
wrong distinctions. It is true, of course, that legislators can and should be
both advocates and judges of the laws on which they vote. It is not even
necessary for legislators to grant a hearing or build a record before they
vote on the merits of a bill. 4 Administrators, however, should not have
the same type of power and discretion that lawmakers have. Administra-
tors are not popularly elected and hence much less subject to popular
control. Equally important, administrators have in some circumstances
more power than lawmakers. For example, while Congress may not con-
stitutionally enact a bill of attainder, a prime function of regulatory
agencies is to adjudicate facts and make decisions concerning only the
parties immediately before them.
Given this special brand of administrative power, it is important to
have special controls on its exercise. Thus, the mere fact that Congress
need not build a record or hold hearings to support its factual findings
should not exempt agencies from such requirements. Congressmen, in
deciding the fate of various pieces of legislation, are often the recipients
of ex parte communications, yet Professor Davis would admittedly feel
uneasy in allowing commissioners to be subject to the same range of ex
parte communications, even in formal rule-making activities. 5 Similarly,
when agencies use the adjudicative form to make a rule, the unfairness
inherent in permitting a combination of functions is not lessened by argu-
ing that Congress could have done this. Neither is the unfairness lessened
by arguing, as Professor Davis does,7 that the commissioners could have
entirely avoided the problem by using the legislative procedures of sec-
tion 4 of the APA77 to fulfill the legislative task of making rules. Having
chosen the adjudicative model, the commissioners should follow the ex-
pected procedures of that model. If the procedures prove too burden-
some the answer is not to drop the procedural guarantees and keep the
facade of adjudicative fairness. Rather, the rule-making procedures should
be altered and perhaps made less adjudicative.78
73. Id. § 13.00, at 444-45.
74. See, e.g., Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
75. See generally Davis § 13.12 (Supp. 1970).
76. Id. § 13.00, at 445.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
78. Cf. Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 Yale L.J. 652, 653-54 (1965).
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IV. FOREIGN LAW AS A MEANS OF EVALUATING THE COMBINATION
OF FUNCTIONS IN AMERICAN AGENCIES
The United States has a much wider range of agencies than most, if
not all, European countries. America has, of course, the typical claims
agencies, such as the Social Security Agency and the Veterans Adminis-
tration. But the areas that in the United States are regulated by the
Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Federal Trade Commission, and similar agencies are often
left in Europe to private initiative or are completely taken over by gov-
ernmental nationalization. However, despite the fact that there are no
precise European analogues to the typical American regulatory agency,
European experience and concepts of procedural fairness can still prove
useful.
One of the first lessons one should learn is that although some things
may be done very differently abroad, they still may be done successfully.
In the United States it is often an accepted and unchallenged postulate
that the combination of prosecutorial, legislative, and judicial functions
is the norm. Thus, when it was proposed to internally separate the prose-
cutorial and judicial branches of the National Labor Relations Board
because of attacks on its bias, Senator Benton was astounded:
The Taft-Hartley Act introduced a new concept into the sphere of Government man-
agement by creating a double-headed monstrosity for the administration of a single
statute. Such a concept is contrary to every principle of sound administration, whether
in Government or in private industry.79
In Europe, however, the "double-headed monstrosity" is not so mon-
strous.
A. Italy
In Italy the power to initiate proceedings is usually given to a body
different from the deciding body. 0 Just as the prosecutorial functions are
separated from judicial acts, the initiation of a piece of administrative
action is separated from the action itself."' This separation of powers not
only works administratively, but, as far as can be determined, it works
welV
2
79. 96 Cong. Rec. 6871 (1950). The Taft-Hartley Act, inter alia, required that the NLRB
General Counsel be appointed directly by the President and not by the board members of the
NLRB. Also, hearing examiners are to be independent of the NLRB legal staff. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-187 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970) (passim).
80. Miele, Cotzi & Falconi, Italian Administrative Law, 3 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 421, 451
(1954).
81. Id.
82. See generally S. Galeoti, The Judicial Control of Public Authorities in England and
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Italy divides its court system between judicial and administrative
courts with each system reviewing a different type of administrative act.
The basic line separating jurisdiction is the distinction between "rights"
and "legitimate interests." When a person is directly protected by law,
as when the state illegally and directly takes his property, his rights have
been violated and an ordinary court has jurisdiction to hear his claim.
If his property is taken indirectly-when a legitimate interest as opposed
to a right is violated-he has suffered a loss over which the administra-
tive courts have jurisdiction.' For example, when the state illegally
closes a public street and a party's property loses much of its value, i.e.,
there has been an indirect taking, or if the party was improperly excluded
from the competitive bidding for a public contract, he has not suffered
the loss of any right. However, he has lost a legitimate interest and he has
a cause of action in the administrative courts. The ultimate authority on
all questions of jurisdiction is the Corte di Cassazione, the highest civil
court0M
In addition to this separation of jurisdiction there is also the very im-
portant separation of functions. The Consiglio di Stato, the most impor-
tant of the administrative courts, does not have any prosecutorial func-
tions, and in exercising its judicial functions it shows a large amount of
independence. Though the councillors are appointed by the President,",
they cannot be transferred without their consent; they need not retire
until physically disabled; and they cannot be removed except for negli-
gence or refusal to carry out their duties.
To further preserve and guarantee this separation of functions there is
also a strong prohibition of any agency control over the administrative
judges. In the United States the power of an agency to influence the
cases assigned to its trial examiners was upheld in Ramspeck v. Federal
Trial Examiners Con Jerele. In Alessandro v. The Consiglio Di PreJet-
in Italy (1954). Galeotti made an intensive study of Italian administrative law and reached
this conclusion, though the system has its own short-comings in other respects and is ad-
mittedly not the ideal one. Id. at 237-49.
83. See generally M. Cappelletti, J. Merryman, & J. Perillo, The Italian Legal System: An
Introduction 81-84 (1967) ; M. Cappelletti & J. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (1965).
84. See M. Cappelletti, 3. Merryman, & J. Perillo, The Italian Legal System: An Intro-
duction 80-81 (1967).
85. Id. at 82-83.
86. Treves, Judidal Review in Italian Administrative Law, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 419, 427
(1959) ; M. Cappelletti, J. Merryman, & J. Perillo, supra note 83, at 82.
87. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
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tura of Sassari,8 the Italian Constitutional Court examined the con-
stitutionality of somewhat similar regulations surrounding the adjudica-
tory power of the Consigli di prefettura. The Consigli di prefettura have
adjudicatory powers over government finance matters, including the
power to initiate ex officio financial proceedings. The Italian high court
noted that the financial liability proceeding of this body is an essential
check on the administration of the local departments and on those who
manage the funds of such departments.
When acting as a court this body is composed of the prefect (or his
agent), who acts as the body's president, two officials of the prefecture
belonging to the same branch of the civil service, the director of account-
ing of the same prefecture, and the state's provincial director of ac-
counting. All of these members under the regulations are hierarchically
dependent on the executive, who has the power to adopt measures
affecting their careers, legal status, and transfers. Two of these officials,
in addition, are directly responsible to the prefect-president, who prepares
the reports on which their promotions were based. A third official is in a
roughly similar state of dependence. The court also noted:
There is no statute which regulates the composition of the Consiglio di prefettura
or the period of service of its members. Total or partial changes in the composition
of this judicial organ, therefore, depend exclusively on the discretionary power of the
central administration over the careers and transfers of the officials. Moreover, the
manner and time of rotation of the two officials of the career prefectorate are similarly
conditioned on the free choice exercised by the prefect in the organization and super-
vision of his subordinates.8 9
These regulations, the court held, were a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of judicial independence. Other regulations providing that
proceedings against administrators could be initiated and conducted by
the Consiglio di prefettura on its own initiative or on the initiative of the
prefect-president, despite the fact that the administrative prosecuting
functions were also performed by the same prefect, were also held un-
constitutional as a violation of the principle of judicial impartiality.
In Dantonia v. Tresso,9 ° the constitutional court proved that it had no
intentions of wavering from the principle laid down in Allessandro. The
court struck down the judicial competence of the giunta provinciale am-
ministrativa (the Provincial Administrative Committees) because of the
lack of independence of three of the five members of the giunta. These
three were really officials of the executive. One was the prefect (or his
88. 11 Giur. Cost. 879 (1966) (Corte Costituzionale).
89. Id. at 885.
90. [19671 Giur. Ital. 1 598 (Corte Costituzionale).
[Vol. 40
COMBINATION OF FUNCTIONS
agent) and the other two were his subordinates, who were appointed by
him each year in an "absolutely discretional" manner. The rule in Alles-
sandro also includes the case where the independence of the administra-
tive judges is compromised, not by the executive, but by private profes-
sional associations9 l
Added to these safeguards is the Italian constitutional guarantee of the
"Natural Judge.' 92 The purpose of this protection is to prohibit any
discretionary rotation of judges. The parties in any civil (and of course
criminal) case are assured that no party or governmental agency shall
have any influence in designating certain judges to hear or not hear
certain cases.93
B. Germany
Germany too has strict requirements to assure litigants their right to
the independence of administrative judges"4 and to their "lawful judge.""3
In order to prevent ad hoc appointment of judges, court regulations must,
insofar as is possible, determine in advance which court, which panel of
that court, and which judges are to decide given cases.90 Even a proce-
dural defect in the determination of the date of trial will infect the de-
cision with unconstitutionality if there is a causal relationship between
the procedural defect and the decision, such as is the case where an incor-
rect determination of the date affects the composition of the trial court.97
Such procedural protection is in stark contrast to Ramspeck v. Federal
91. Calibeo v. Presidente Consiglio di Nlnistri, [1963] Foro. Ital. I 11 (Corte Costituz-
ionale).
92. Costituzionale art. 25 (1947) (Italy): "No one shall be denied the right to be tried
by his natural and lawfully appointed judge." Translated in Al. Cappelletti, J. Merryman,
& J. Perillo, The Italian Legal System: An Introduction 286 (1967). See generally Pepe, 7
Giur. Cost. 959 (1962) (Corte Costituzionale).
93. However, a judge may be held to be "unfit" by the judicial organ, the Corte di Cas-
sazione. Such an unfit judge is not a natural judge, Casoli, 8 Giur. Cost. 471 (1963) (Corte
Costituzionale), and the case may be transferred to a different judge than the one originally
established by law.
94. See generally Judgment of Nov. 9, 1955, 4 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfasstngsge-
richts (BVerfG) 331.
95. See Grundgesetz art. 101(1) (1949) (W. Ger.), which provides: "Extraordinary
Courts shall be inadmissible. No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful
judge."
96. See generally Judgment of March 24, 1964, 17 BVerfG 294.
97. Judgment of March 20, 1956, 4 BVerfG 412. It is, however, proper and is no violation
of the right to the lawful judge for the court of appeal to select the court for remand, unless
the court of appeal acts in an arbitrary manner. Judgment of Oct. 25, 1966, 20 BVerfG 336,
345-46.
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Trial Examiners Conference,9 which upheld the discretionary rotation
of the administrative trial examiners.
Germany also has a system of administrative courts which are in-
dependent of the regular judiciary and of the executive." Administrative
acts either result in a benefit and grant a right, such as the right to have
a driver's license, or impose a burden, such as induction into the army.
All administrative acts must have a proper statutory basis, especially
those acts which impose burdens. On application the administrative
courts will set aside all those acts which lack such statutory authority.
As has been suggested, the problem of administrative bias caused by a
combination of functions may be lessened by a separation of functions.
Such a separation can be accomplished either by a separation into differ-
ent agencies with one prosecuting and another (an administrative court)
judging,'0° or by a separation of functions within a given agency. The
Italian and German experiences prove that a great amount of separation
is a realistic and fruitful goal. However, if this goal is not achieved,
individual rights could still be afforded more protection than at present if
the judicial court would exercise a policy of broader review in those
cases in which the administrative act complained of was the product of
a combination of functions. The French experience may prove useful in
this respect. The scope of review of the Conseil d'Etat, the French ad-
ministrative high court, is much broader than the average American
review.'0 '
C. France
France, like Italy and Germany, has two court systems-the regular
judicial system and an administrative system which deals with the review
of administrative actions. This division is so complete that whenever an
administrative question is raised, even incidentally, in a judicial court the
question must be decided by the administrative courts while the regular
proceedings are stayed. The basic reason for this division is historical.
The French revolutionaries, to prevent the courts from interfering with
central reform (as the pre-revolutionary courts often had), enacted laws
forbidding the judiciary from interfering with administrative officials in
any matter. An individual harmed by an agency action, therefore, could
only turn to the executive for relief. Napoleon then created the Conseil
98. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
99. Jurisdictional problems between the courts are lessened by a complex series of rules.
100. See Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
Yale L.J. 931 (1960). Mr. Hector is a former member of the CAB.
101. See H. Abraham, The Judicial Process 272 (2d ed. 1968).
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d'Etat, a body of experts who were to act as legal advisers to the govern-
ment. Napoleon also referred petitions for relief from administrative
actions to this body. A special division (section du contentieux) was cre-
ated to handle these petitions, which, in the course of time, became a
court, creating by case law a system of French administrative law. Lower
courts have emerged and the Conseil d'Etat has become the court of last
resort, with broad powers of review.'0 - Though the Conseil d'Etat is
within the executive branch, it is an independent and strong control on
administrative bodies. Belgium, Egypt, and Greece have developed their
own Conseils d'Etat based on the French model.'
The Conseil d'Etat has five basic grounds for review: (1) L'Inexis-
tence, i.e., the administrative act may lack an essential element and thus
be simply non-existent and void ab initio; (2) Incompetence, i.e., lack
of authority, such as when a bureaucrat does not have authority from his
superior; (3) Violation de la loi, i.e., failure to carry out a nondiscre-
tionary duty; (4) Vice de orine, i.e., failure to follow a procedural rule;
and (5) Detournement de pouvoir, i.e., the use of the administrative
powers for an improper purpose, a subjective inquiry into the motives of
the agency and its members.'
It is this last ground of review which, from the American perspective,
is the broadest and the most unusual. If the administrator directs the
taking of private property, allegedly for the proper purpose of setting up
a public museum on the land, the Conseil d'Etat will set the order aside
if the true purpose was to prevent another person (a stranger to the lo-
cality) from buying the land." Under the authority of detournement de
pouvoir, if the bureaucrat creates a job in order to place a friend in it, or
if he removes a civil servant in order to appoint another to the opening,
the orders will be quashed."' Similarly, when the Mayor of Vengeons
102. It is of interest to note that since the French Constitution of 1958, the Conseil d'Etat
has broadened its review in order to limit executive power based on unconstitutional statutes.
Thus it will go to extremes to interpret statutes so that they will conform to the Constitution
and to so-called "General Principles." It will give damages to persons hurt by acts authorized
by unconstitutional statutes. See M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World
18 (tent. ed. 1969).
103. R. David and H. de Vries, The French Legal System 40 (1958).
104. See generally H. Abraham, The judicial Process 270-71 (2d ed. 1968); Auby, The
Abuse of Power in French Administrative Law, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 549 (1970); Horvath,
Rights of Man, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 539, 559-71 (1955).
105. Ministre de l'Intirieur v. Boucher, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 685, as noted in Auby,
supra note 104, at 556.
106. See Dame Michel, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 403, as noted in Auby, supra note 104, at
556; Demoiselle Soulier, [1954] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 139.
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argued that he was acting properly when he ruled that no dance hall could
be open at certain hours without his special permission, the plaintiffs con-
testing the order were afforded the opportunity of alleging that the mayor
was also a tavern owner and his establishment was the sole competitor
of the dance halls. When the mayor denied this charge there was an in-
vestigation into his subjective motives. The court held that it had been
established that the mayor was motivated by considerations which were
not public in nature. Therefore his order was set aside.107
In Italy the review of administrative actions is also broad enough to
preclude any irregularity. Doctrines which are important in American
administrative law, such as questions of fact, questions of law, mixed
questions, the substantial evidence rule, jurisdictional facts, and errors on
the face of the record have no meaning when the review is so broad.108
Although American federal courts would not exercise such broad review
of federal agencies, some state courts have held that the special case of a
combination of functions requires a closer scrutiny to be exercised by the
court on review. Thus the New Jersey courts have held that although the
Rule of Necessity prevents a city attorney charged with misconduct from
enjoining proceedings on the ground that the administrative judge was
biased, 0 9 the court will make its own findings on appeal in order to pro-
tect the individual's rights to a fair hearing where "the record is utterly
devoid of substantive testimony supporting defendant's findings of plain-
tiff's guilt of the charges made."" 0
V. CONCLUSION
The comparative approach proves that the extensive combination of
functions so common and accepted in American administrative law is by
no means the natural order of things. The institutional bias caused by
such a combination of functions "shocks" the European judicial con-
science and is often regarded as a violation of due process under conti-
nental constitutions.
The European experience also suggests several methods of reducing
or eliminating the combination of functions. The most straight-forward
107. Demoiselle Rault, [19341 Rec. Cons. d'Et. 337; see A. Von Merhen, The Civil Law
System 316-17 (1957).
108. Treves, supra note 86, at 432.
109. Rinaldi v. Mongiello, 4 N.J. Super. 7, 12, 66 A.2d 182, 184 (1949). The court stated:
"[A] statutory agent may conduct the hearing, even though biased or prejudiced, when no
hearing may otherwise be held ...."
110. Rinaldi v. Mongiello, 7 N.J. Super. 410, 413, 71 A.2d 398, 400 (1949), aff'd per
curiam, 6 N.J. Super. 387, 71 A.2d 404 (1950); accord, Board of Educ. v. Shockley, 52 Del.
277, 156 A.2d 214 (1959).
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and complete way of eliminating the problem would be to establish a
separate administrative court, an American counterpart to the Conseil
d'Etat. Such a proposal, however, evokes strong feelings," and, because
of the radical shift in American administrative law which would be re-
quired, would have little chance of being implemented.
European practice, however, suggests other ways to ameliorate the
problem of a combination of functions. First, the judicial court should ex-
ercise a broad scope of review of the administrative tribunal's actions,
similar to the detournement de pouvoir of the Conseil d'Etat, when the
administrative act complained of was the product of a combination of
functions.11 By limiting a broad review to those cases where it is needed
most, an acceptable compromise is struck between the French and Amer-
ican systems, which allows for procedural protections in this country with-
out unduly interfering with agency expertise.
Secondly, within agencies there should be more reliance on trial ex-
aminers coupled with greater independence on their part. Ramspeck v.
Federal Trial Examiners Conference" should either be overruled by the
courts or not followed by the agencies. Not only would a move in the
direction of Alessandro v. The Consiglio Di Prefettura of Sassari14 make
the trial examiner's hearing fairer, but it would free the agency heads,
allowing them to spend more time on rule-making and on more significant
policy issues.1 5
Finally, Congress should establish a Consumers' Advocate Agency.Yio
A prime reason for the combination of functions in many agencies, such as
the FCC and the ICC, is that the staff members serving the agency heads
are also supposed to be advocates for the consumer. The staff bureau-
crats, in their role as the advocates of one interest (the consumers'), often
have ex parte discussions with the administrators. This practice, which
infects the entire decisional process," 7 is not only inherently unfair, but
also does not usually work to the benefit of the consumer. Those bureau-
crats who have the ear of the commissioners must serve two masters: in
111. Compare Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
69 Yale L.J. 931, 932 (1960) with Davis § 1.04-4, at 13 (Supp. 1970), and Kintner, The
Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. Hector, 69 Yale L.J. 965,
967 (1960).
112. See notes 104-107 supra and accompanying text.
113. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
114. 11 Giur. Cost. 879 (1966) (Corte Costituzionale).
115. Cf. Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 Yale L.J. 652, 654-55 (1965).
116. Implementation of this suggestion would also be a move toward reducing the com-
bination of functions without actually establishing an administrative court.
117. Davis § 13.00 (Supp. 1970).
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theory and in practice their role as advocate for the public is muted by
their role as impartial aides to the commission. Since the so-called advo-
cates of the consumer must also be judges and are not to take "precon-
ceived" (i.e., pro-consumer) positions, they are limited in the vigor of
their advocacy and consequently in their effectiveness as protectors of
the interests of the consumer. 118
By creating a special, independent consumers' advocate, the combina-
tion of functions within one agency can be reduced. As the process be-
comes more truly adversarial, with the elimination of this type of ex parte
communication, it becomes fairer to all concerned. And when the con-
sumers obtain a full-time, independent advocate as well as a watchdog
over the agencies, the administrative process will also become more
effective." 9
European practices show that these suggested reforms are consistent
with effective administrative law. These remedies should also promote a
fairer and more efficient administrative procedure.
118. Id. at 449-52.
119. Professor Davis proposes a complicated "solution" to this problem, id. at 455-56, but
it does not go to the root of the problem because he would still have the agency staff mem-
bers serve two masters, the agency and the consumer. However, it should be noted that
Professor Davis suggests the plan only as a sample and not as a final model.
